Can We (Anti)Trust LEED?: An Analysis of the Antitrust Implications for the Green Building Movement by Alfano, Jessica
Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review
Volume 41 | Issue 2 Article 5
4-11-2014
Can We (Anti)Trust LEED?: An Analysis of the
Antitrust Implications for the Green Building
Movement
Jessica Alfano
Boston College Law School, jessica.alfano@bc.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/ealr
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, Construction Law Commons,
Environmental Law Commons, and the Property Law and Real Estate Commons
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For
more information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jessica Alfano, Can We (Anti)Trust LEED?: An Analysis of the Antitrust Implications for the Green
Building Movement, 41 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 427 (2014), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/ealr/
vol41/iss2/5
  427 
CAN WE (ANTI)TRUST LEED?:  
AN ANALYSIS OF THE ANTITRUST 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE GREEN 
BUILDING MOVEMENT 
JESSICA ALFANO* 
Abstract: Sustainable construction and energy efficient structures are en vogue, 
and a “green building movement” has produced buildings all over the country 
and the world that are constructed from sustainable, energy efficient materials 
meant to minimize the building’s impact on the environment. A leader in this 
movement is the U.S. Green Building Council (USGBC), a private, non-profit 
organization that stresses sustainability in all areas of construction. The 
USGBC’s flagship work is a rating system called Leadership in Environmental 
Design (LEED) that measures and endorses the sustainability of a building. The 
success of this movement in general and the LEED rating in particular could be 
compromised, however, by the possibility of antitrust liability deriving from the 
widespread adoption of the LEED standard. This Note examines the green build-
ing movement and relevant antitrust case law and recommends ways that the 
USGBC can avoid antitrust scrutiny and continue its important work. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2011, famed sustainable architect Luis de Garrido unveiled a twenty-
five bedroom home built in the shape of the ancient Egyptian symbol of pro-
tection, power, and health, the Eye of Horus.1 Despite the unique and luxurious 
architecture, perhaps the most impressive aspect of this stunning mansion is its 
complete self-sufficiency.2 The outline of the structure is made of photovoltaic 
panels that work in conjunction with a geothermal system to provide all the 
                                                                                                                           
 * Executive Note Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 2013–
2014. 
 1 Luis de Garrido, ARCHELLO, http://www.archello.com/en/company/luis-de-garrido (last visited 
Jan. 23, 2014), available at http://perma.cc/75H3-QAVC; Vrushti Mawani, The Personal Mega-Sized 
Eye of Horus: Naomi Campbell’s Eco-Mansion, INDUS. LEADERS MAG. (Sept. 19, 2011), http://www.
industryleadersmagazine.com/the-personal-mega-sized-eye-of-horus-naomi-campbells-eco-mansion/, 
available at http://perma.cc/A2CD-FJNU. 
 2 Rashed El Singaby, Naomi Campbell’s Eye of Horus House—By Luis de Garrido, URBAN PEEK 
(Oct. 30, 2011), http://urbanpeek.com/2011/10/30/naomi-campbells-eye-of-horus-house-by-luis-de-
garrido/, available at http://perma.cc/35EU-S3LF. 
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energy needed for the home to operate.3 This means that the massive home 
requires no electrical grid connections to provide heating or cooling.4 Further-
more, the structure boasts both a rainwater harvesting system for collecting 
water and a biological treatment system for treating waste water.5 This ingen-
ious, self-reliant design is the product of a movement toward sustainability in 
construction that has gained popularity in response to concerns regarding pol-
lution and diminishing sources of energy.6 
In the 1970s, interest grew surrounding sustainable building practices, 
and by the 1990s a movement, which became known as the green building 
movement, had taken shape.7 With a focus on energy efficiency and the use of 
environmentally friendly building techniques and materials, the green building 
movement seeks to reduce the negative impact that green buildings have on the 
environment.8 The continued growth and innovation of this movement has cre-
ated masterpieces and marvels such as Garrido’s Eye of Horus, the Wat Pa 
Maha Chedio Kaew Temple in Thailand (made of more than 1.5 million recy-
cled glass bottles), and a 632-meter-tall skyscraper with its own rainwater re-
covery and wind energy harvesting systems.9 
This Note presents an overview of green buildings and examines what 
this term has come to mean, the history of the green building movement, and 
the costs and benefits of green construction.10 Next, this Note explores the 
ways in which green building initiatives have been adopted by various cities, 
as well as governmental involvement in encouraging this movement at the fed-
eral, state, and local levels.11 This Note then analyzes the arena of antitrust law 
                                                                                                                           
 3 Id. 
 4 Tafline Laylin, Luis de Garrido Unveils Incredible Glass-Domed Eco House Shaped Like the 
Eye of Horus, INHABITAT (Sept. 17, 2011), http://inhabitat.com/naomi-campbells-massive-island-eco-
house-in-turkey-is-shaped-like-the-eye-of-horus/naomi-campbell-ecohouse-1/?extend=1, available at 
http://perma.cc/4MC7-PNGN. 
 5 Mawani, supra note 1. 
 6 Mawani, supra note 1; Alia Haley, Architects Pick—10 Best Green Buildings, SMASHING BUZZ 
(Nov. 10, 2011), http://www.smashingbuzz.com/2011/11/architects-pick-10-best-green-buildings/, 
available at http://perma.cc/MS2M-B94N. 
 7 See U.S. GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL, WHITE PAPER ON GREEN CONSTRUCTION 4–5 (2003). 
 8 Mark J. Bennett et al., Green Buildings and Sustainable Development, in 2008 EMERGING IS-
SUES 282, § 1.01(1) at 1 (2008). Like any other building, a green building can have a disruptive im-
pact on the surrounding environment, but green builders seek to reduce this impact in every way pos-
sible. Id. 
 9 MARBLE INST. OF AM., HISTORY OF GREEN BUILDING 3 (2011), available at http://www.
marble-institute.com/pdfs/historystoneingreenbuilding.pdf and http://perma.cc/36M4-HDLU; El Sing-
aby, supra note 2; Haley, supra note 6. 
 10 See infra notes 14–81 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra notes 82–132 and accompanying text. 
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that could potentially impact the trajectory of the green building movement.12 
Finally, this Note articulates ways that the green building movement generally 
and the United States Green Building Council (USGBC) in particular can 
avoid antitrust liability for their Leadership in Energy and Environmental De-
sign (LEED) standard.13 
I. GREEN BUILDINGS OVERVIEW 
A. What Are Green Buildings? 
The green building movement focuses on reducing the overall environ-
mental impact of new and existing buildings through various methods, such as 
the use of recycled materials, energy efficient design, and water protection and 
conservation.14 The terms “green buildings” or “green construction” refer to 
buildings and projects designed with a special focus on efficiency and sustain-
ability.15 As this movement has begun to gain momentum, various bodies have 
emerged to promote, substantiate, and verify the legitimacy and benefits of 
green construction.16 
The most prominent of these groups is the USGBC, a non-governmental, 
non-profit organization focused on improving the way that buildings are built 
and maintained so as to make them more environmentally friendly and sustain-
able.17 This group’s flagship work is the development and administration of the 
LEED certification system.18 LEED’s 110-point commercial rating scale is 
regarded as the “standard for measuring building sustainability.”19 More than 
130 countries use this voluntary, third-party verification system that focuses on 
social responsibility in building construction.20 Although the certification sys-
                                                                                                                           
 12 See infra notes 133–69 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 170–253 and accompanying text. 
 14 Bennett et al., supra note 8, § 1.01(1) at 1. 
 15 OFFICE OF THE FED. ENVTL. EXEC., FEDERAL COMMITMENT TO GREEN BUILDING: EXPERI-
ENCES AND EXPECTATIONS 5 (2003). 
 16 Bennett et al., supra note 8, § 1.03 at 5; see LEED Certification Information, NAT. RESOURCES 
DEF. COUNCIL, http://www.nrdc.org/buildinggreen/leed.asp (last visited Feb. 2, 2014), available at 
http://perma.cc/9FN5-5S33; Links, NAT. RESOURCES DEF. COUNCIL, http://www.nrdc.org/building
green/links/default.asp (last visited Feb. 2, 2014), available at http://perma.cc/MWL3-5VFQ; 
USGBC, http://new.usgbc.org/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2014), available at http://perma.cc/6DBJ-LT8V; 
GREEN SEAL, http://www.greenseal.org/Home.aspx (last visited Feb. 2, 2014), available at http://
perma.cc/PMV9-SHEJ. 
 17 Bennett et al., supra note 8, §§ 1.03–.04(3) at 5–8; About USGBC, USGBC, http://new.
usgbc.org/about (last visited Apr. 9, 2013), available at http://perma.cc/G5RD-EX36. 
 18 Bennett et al., supra note 8, §§ 1.03–.04(3) at 5–8; see About USGBC, supra note 17. 
 19 LEED Certification Information, supra note 16; LEED, USGBC, http://new.usgbc.org/leed (last 
visited Apr. 9, 2013), available at http://perma.cc/K8GS-M8VY. 
 20 LEED, supra note 19. 
430 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 41:427 
tem has rating scales addressing the retrofitting of existing buildings, the most 
widely used rating scale is sustainable new construction.21 In addition to 
LEED’s general rating systems for new construction and retrofitting, the 
USGBC promulgates rating systems that specifically address home, school, 
retail, and healthcare construction, among others.22 Obtaining LEED certifica-
tion for a building demonstrates a commitment to environmental stewardship, 
leadership, and innovation in construction.23 
Although LEED is the most well-known certification system for green 
buildings, it is not the only avenue through which buildings can receive third-
party verification of their environmental integrity.24 For example, Green Seal is 
an organization that develops sustainability standards for products and services 
to help create and encourage a green economy by identifying for consumers 
products that are credibly environmentally friendly.25 Whereas LEED focuses 
on construction of new buildings, Green Seal concentrates on the operation 
and maintenance of existing structures.26 Green Seal developed manuals for 
guiding the operation and maintenance of green buildings in three regions, 
namely the northern, southeast and southwest regions of the United States.27 
These manuals are geared toward public housing but can be applied to other 
buildings.28 Each manual offers guidance in areas such as landscaping, light-
ing, roofing maintenance, water fixtures, water conservation, heating, ventila-
                                                                                                                           
 21 Bennett et al., supra note 8, § 1.04(1) at 6; LEED Certification Information, supra note 16; 
LEED Green Building Rating Systems, USGBC, http://new.usgbc.org/leed/rating-systems (last visited 
Apr. 9, 2013), available at http://perma.cc/ED34-TT3F. 
 22 LEED Green Building Rating Systems, supra note 21. 
 23 LEED, supra note 19. 
 24 Bennett et al., supra note 8, § 1.04.1 at 6; see About Green Seal, GREEN SEAL, http://www.
greenseal.org/AboutGreenSeal.aspx (last visited Apr. 9, 2013), available at http://perma.cc/NTM9-
CBNM. 
 25 About Green Seal, supra note 24. 
 26 See Bennett et al., supra note 8, § 1.04.1 at 6; Green Business, GREEN SEAL, http://www.
greenseal.org/GreenBusiness/InstitutionalGreeningPrograms/GreenBuildingOperationsMaintenance.
aspx (last visited Apr. 9, 2013), available at http://perma.cc/MQH3-LNZW; LEED Certification In-
formation, supra note 16. 
 27 Green Business, supra note 26; see ANDREW BEAUCHAMP ET AL., GREEN BUILDING OPERATIONS 
AND MAINTENANCE MANUAL: A GUIDE FOR PUBLIC HOUSING AUTHORITIES IN THE NORTHERN CLI-
MATE REGION (Green Seal & Siemens eds., 2011) [hereinafter NORTHERN MANUAL]; ANDREW BEAU-
CHAMP ET AL., GREEN BUILDING OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE MANUAL: A GUIDE FOR PUBLIC 
HOUSING AUTHORITIES IN THE SOUTHEAST CLIMATE REGION (Green Seal & Siemens eds., 2011) [here-
inafter SOUTHEAST MANUAL]; ANDREW BEAUCHAMP ET AL., GREEN BUILDING OPERATIONS AND 
MAINTENANCE MANUAL: A GUIDE FOR PUBLIC HOUSING AUTHORITIES IN THE SOUTHWEST CLIMATE 
REGION (Green Seal & Siemens eds., 2011) [hereinafter SOUTHWEST MANUAL]. 
 28 Green Business, supra note 26; see NORTHERN MANUAL, supra note 27; SOUTHEAST MANU-
AL, supra note 27; SOUTHWEST MANUAL, supra note 27. 
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tion, and air conditioning, and each manual responds to the specific demands 
of the different regions.29 
In addition to private organizations such as the USGBC and Green Seal, 
there are government initiatives aimed at promoting and certifying green pro-
jects, including green construction.30 Prominent among these is ENERGY 
STAR, a joint program between the EPA and the Department of Energy.31 Like 
the programs discussed above, ENERGY STAR certifies products as meeting 
certain efficiency standards and provides guidance for the construction and 
maintenance of green buildings.32 
In addition to the various forms of green certification, another recently 
popular innovation of the green building movement is the incorporation of 
green roofs.33 Green roofs at least partially cover the roof of a building with 
vegetation such as trees, shrubs, and gardens.34 Among other things, green 
roofs provide additional green space in areas that normally lack it, reduce the 
energy consumption of the buildings upon which they are located, diminish the 
amount of storm water runoff, and can increase the lifespan of the roof.35 Add-
ing a green roof component can also maximize the useful space of the building 
by offering a local source for food production.36 Green roofs also reduce the 
“heat island” effect in urban areas.37 While traditional buildings make urban 
                                                                                                                           
 29 Green Business, supra note 26; see NORTHERN MANUAL, supra note 27; SOUTHEAST MANU-
AL, supra note 27; SOUTHWEST MANUAL, supra note 27. 
 30 See Improving the Energy Efficiency of Commercial Buildings, DEP’T OF ENERGY, http://
www1.eere.energy.gov/buildings/commercial/index.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2014), available at 
http://perma.cc/CLP8-UMK4; History of ENERGY STAR, ENERGY STAR, http://www.energystar.
gov/index.cfm?c=about.ab_history (last visited Feb. 2, 2014), available at http://perma.cc/KKS4-
33JH. 
 31 About Energy Star, ENERGY STAR, http://www.energystar.gov/index.cfm?c=about.ab_index 
(last visited Apr. 9, 2013), available at http://perma.cc/H657-EZZA. 
 32 Guidelines for Energy Management Overview, ENERGY STAR, http://www.energystar.gov/
index.cfm?c=guidelines.guidelines_index (last visited Apr. 9, 2013), available at http://perma.cc/
XXU2-E2S4 (setting guidelines for green buildings); How a Product Earns the ENERGY STAR Label, 
ENERGY STAR, http://www.energystar.gov/index.cfm?c=products.pr_how_earn (last visited Apr. 9, 
2013), available at http://perma.cc/QDU7-KU2V (setting standards for green products). 
 33 J. Cullen Howe, Green Roofs, 2008 EMERGING ISSUES 3069 at 2. 
 34 Id. at 1. 
 35 Id. at 2; Green Roof Benefits, GREEN ROOFS FOR HEALTHY CITIES, http://www.greenroofs.org/
index.php/about/greenroofbenefits (last visited Apr. 9, 2013), available at http://perma.cc/G8JT-
3SZW. Other possible benefits of green roofs include providing a habitat for birds and butterflies and 
improving air quality. Howe, supra note 33, at 2. 
 36 Howe, supra note 33, at 2. 
 37 Id. The heat island effect can raise temperatures to uncomfortably high or dangerous levels for 
residents of urban areas, increase summertime peak energy demand, and increase air conditioning 
costs, among other things. Heat Island Effect, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/heatisland/
index.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2014), available at http://perma.cc/J4CP-FXMZ. 
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areas hotter by soaking up the Sun’s heat and radiating it back out, roofs cov-
ered in vegetation radiate less heat back into the air.38 For example, at Chica-
go’s City Hall temperatures of twenty-five to eighty degrees cooler were 
measured on green roofs as opposed to nearby traditional roofs.39 
A guiding force behind these various programs is the lifecycle approach.40 
Under this method, companies develop and implement a plan, evaluate its pro-
gress, and execute necessary improvements in a continuous, cyclical pattern.41 
In this way, organizations promoting green buildings and green construction 
can assess the effect of their work throughout the life of a building and contin-
ue to improve the efficiency of their standards by incorporating new innova-
tions and technologies as they become available.42 For example, the USGBC 
uses standing committees to review new data and refine LEED standards.43 
These committees, comprised of volunteers and experts in the many disciplines 
necessary to set standards for all areas covered by LEED, help LEED stand-
ards to remain at the forefront of the field.44 
B. The History of Green Buildings 
Like many environmental movements, the green building movement’s 
roots can be traced back to the 1970s, when high oil prices and general aware-
ness of environmental concerns spurred the earliest experiments in green 
building.45 It was not until the 1990s, however, that a true movement focused 
on green construction began to form.46 
From its inception, this movement has combined both governmental and 
privately backed initiatives.47 An important early federal milestone was the 
                                                                                                                           
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Bennett et al., supra note 8, § 1.02 at 3; see About Green Seal, supra note 24; Guidelines for 
Energy Management Overview, supra note 32; LEED, supra note 19; LEED Certification Information, 
supra note 16. 
 41 Guidelines for Energy Management Overview, supra note 32. 
 42 Developing LEED, USGBC, http://new.usgbc.org/leed/developing-leed (last visited Apr. 9, 
2013), available at http://perma.cc/NJG3-3JEL; LEED Certification Information, supra note 16; 
News, Events and Publications, GREEN SEAL, http://www.greenseal.org/NewsEventsAndInitiatives.
aspx (last visited Apr. 9, 2013), available at http://perma.cc/JZ82-K3WF. 
 43 LEED Committees, USGBC, http://new.usgbc.org/about/committees/leed (last visited Apr. 9, 
2013), available at http://perma.cc/UZV6-XKA6. 
 44 Id.; Developing LEED, supra note 42. 
 45 Green Building Basic Information, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/greenbuilding/
pubs/about.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2013), http://perma.cc/S5FN-N4BN; see U.S. GREEN BLDG. 
COUNCIL, supra note 7, at 4–5. An early example of a green building built in the 1970s is the Willis 
Faber and Dumas Headquarters in England. MARBLE INST. OF AM., supra note 9, at 2. 
 46 Green Building Basic Information, supra note 45. 
 47 See id. 
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launch of the ENERGY STAR program by the EPA and Department of Energy 
in 1992.48 Additionally, the success of President Bill Clinton’s project to 
“Green the White House” brought national attention to the importance of green 
construction and prompted other “greening” projects in government build-
ings.49 Following these projects was a flurry of Executive Orders requiring 
action and research to improve the nation’s environment, many of which fo-
cused on sustainable building techniques.50 
In combination with this intense federal focus on green construction, a se-
rious private effort also began with the founding of the USGBC in 1993.51 In 
its brief history, this organization has been recognized as “one of the most suc-
cessful examples of nonprofit membership organization development in recent 
history.”52 In 1998, the USGBC launched the first version of the LEED rating 
system, and by 2003, 948 projects were registered in the program.53 Although 
LEED is considered the most widely known program of its kind, it is not 
alone; during the course of this movement, several other private systems with a 
similar focus have emerged and grown.54 
C. Costs and Benefits of Green Construction 
1. Benefits of Green Construction 
With a focus on sustainable and efficient growth, the green building 
movement’s benefits spread across environmental, economic, and social are-
nas.55 While satisfying the primary goal of achieving environmental benefits, 
                                                                                                                           
 48 Id. 
 49 U.S. GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL, supra note 7, at 5. 
 50 Id. at 5–6. For example, Executive Order 13,123 sought to use better building design, construc-
tion, and operation to improve energy efficiency and reduce emissions in federal buildings. Id.; see 
Exec. Order No. 13,123, 64 Fed. Reg. 30,851 (Jun. 8, 1999). Additionally, Executive Order 12,852 
established the President’s Council on Sustainable Development. Exec. Order No. 12,852, 58 Fed. 
Reg. 35,841 (Jul. 2, 1993). 
 51 See U.S. GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL, supra note 7, at 6; Green Building Basic Information, supra 
note 45; USGBC History, USGBC, http://new.usgbc.org/about/history (last visited Feb. 26, 2014), 
available at http://perma.cc/Y547-S7UQ. 
 52 U.S. GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL, supra note 7, at 6. 
 53 Id. at 7. 
 54 Bennett et al., supra note 8, § 1.04(1) at 6; see supra notes 16, 24–29 and accompanying text. 
Examples of other private green initiatives include Green Seal, Greenguard, and the Living Building 
Challenge. Lauren Said-Moorhouse, “World’s Greenest Buildings” Get Seal of Approval, CNN (Jun. 28, 
2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/21/world/living-building-challenge/, available at http://perma.
cc/KP99-47HH (Living Building Challenge was founded in 2006); Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), 
GREENGUARD CERTIFICATION, http://greenguard.org/en/faq.aspx (last visited Feb. 26, 2014), available 
at http://perma.cc/X2LA-VYGG; GREEN SEAL, supra note 16 (Green Seal was founded in 1989). 
 55 Bennett et al., supra note 8, § 1.01(1), (3) at 1, 2. 
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this movement also produces important economic advantages or incentives to 
those who construct green buildings.56 
Reducing a building’s negative impact on the environment is a central 
aim of green construction.57 All buildings draw on many resources, such as 
raw materials, electricity, and water, and can create harmful environmental 
impacts such as debris created during construction and greenhouse gases emit-
ted during use.58 Green construction puts an emphasis on minimizing the vari-
ous adverse environmental impacts of a building through practices focused on 
energy, materials, and water efficiency.59 The siting of a project is also im-
portant in green construction.60 For green construction, considerations regard-
ing the location of a new building take into account minimizing the disturb-
ance it will have on the environment and existing infrastructure of the sur-
rounding area, both during construction and during the life of the building.61 
Although the green building movement might have originated to benefit 
the environment, the most frequently cited benefit of green construction is the 
long-term cost savings to the building’s owner.62 Because energy efficiency is 
a central tenet of green construction, the operating costs of buildings with 
LEED certification are meant to be noticeably lower than uncertified build-
ings.63 Although results can vary across different types of buildings, a 2003 
report found an overall decrease in operating costs of 13.6% and 8.5% for new 
and existing buildings, respectively, when employing LEED-recognized green 
methods.64 In addition to the lower operating costs, the same 2003 report found 
that tenants are typically more willing to pay higher rents for green buildings, 
                                                                                                                           
 56 See GREG KATS, THE COSTS AND FINANCIAL BENEFITS OF GREEN BUILDINGS, at ii (2003); 
The Business Case for Green Building, USGBC, http://new.usgbc.org/articles/business-case-green-
building (last visited Apr. 9, 2013), available at http://perma.cc/6K8P-CAEJ. 
 57 Bennett et al., supra note 8, § 1.01(1) at 1. 
 58 Id. § 1.01(2) at 2. 
 59 Id. § 1.01(1) at 1. 
 60 Id.; LEED Green Building Rating Systems, supra note 21. 
 61 Bennett et al., supra note 8, § 1.02 at 3; see LEED Green Building Rating Systems, supra note 
21. 
 62 Bennett et al., supra note 8, § 1.01(3) at 2; Robin Suttell, The True Costs of Building Green, 
BUILDINGS (Apr. 3, 2006), http://www.buildings.com/article-details/articleid/3029/title/the%20true%
20costs%20of%20building%20green.aspx, available at http://perma.cc/T6EF-C32S; Green Building 
Costs, CITY OF BLOOMINGTON, http://bloomington.in.gov/green-building-costs (last visited Feb. 26, 
2014), available at http://perma.cc/S6YV-VRNA; The Business Case for Green Building, supra note 
56. 
 63 Bennett et al., supra note 8, § 1.01(3) at 2; The Business Case for Green Building, supra note 
56. 
 64 Press Release, McGraw Hill Construction, Green Building Market Grows 50% in Two Years 
Despite Recession, Says McGraw-Hill Construction Report (Nov. 12, 2010), available at http://
construction.com/aboutus/2010/1112pr.asp and http://perma.cc/K59T-BHCL; The Business Case for 
Green Building, supra note 56. 
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and occupancy rates for such buildings increase by 6.4% for new buildings and 
2.5% for existing projects.65 
An additional advantage of green construction is the social benefit.66 For 
example, occupants and employees in green buildings often have a better qual-
ity of life and fewer health problems, including fewer communicable respirato-
ry illnesses and decreases in allergy and asthma symptoms.67 Additionally, the 
focus on appropriate siting for green buildings prevents new construction from 
stressing the established infrastructure where it is located.68 Furthermore, ob-
taining a form of third-party verification such as a Green Seal or LEED certifi-
cation communicates a company’s commitment to sustainable development, 
which can increase goodwill toward the company.69 
Overall, green buildings offer important, yet often unquantifiable, ad-
vantages such as minimized environmental impacts and social benefits.70 Of 
critical importance, however, are the more easily measurable economic bene-
fits.71 Because green construction can increase a business’s bottom line, this 
movement has been able to gain popularity among many of the nation’s, and 
the world’s, biggest energy consumers.72 
2. Costs of Green Construction 
Although the benefits of green construction are substantial, there are 
some moderate associated costs.73 Many people mistakenly believe the cost 
associated with green construction to be prohibitively high, when in actuality 
the “green premium” is much lower than expected.74 Furthermore, data sug-
gests that as builders gain experience in green construction, the upfront cost to 
                                                                                                                           
 65 The Business Case for Green Building, supra note 56. 
 66 Bennett et al., supra note 8, § 1.01(3) at 2. 
 67 Id. § 1.01(3) at 2; William J. Fisk, Health and Productivity Gains from Better Indoor Environ-
ments and Their Implications for the U.S. Department of Energy, Presented at the E-Vision 2000 Con-
ference (Oct. 11–13, 2000), available at http://energy.lbl.gov/IED/viaq/pubs/lbnl-47458.pdf and 
http://perma.cc/3ADV-HN4F; The Business Case for Green Building, supra note 56. 
 68 Bennett et al., supra note 8, § 1.01(3) at 2. 
 69 LEED, supra note 19; The Business Case for Green Building, supra note 56; see About 
USGBC, supra note 17; LEED Is Good for Business, USGBC, http://new.usgbc.org/leed/applying-
leed/leed-for-business (last visited Apr. 9, 2013), available at http://perma.cc/Y8KC-NCEB. 
 70 LEED Is Good for Business, supra note 69; see Bennett et al., supra note 8, § 1.01(3) at 2. 
 71 Bennett et al., supra note 8, § 1.01(3) at 2; see LEED is Good for Business, supra note 69. 
 72 See Fisk, supra note 67; LEED Is Good for Business, supra note 69. IBM, Toyota, and Ford are 
among companies that have constructed green buildings. KATS, supra note 56, at vi. 
 73 Fact Sheets: How Much Does Green Building Really Cost?, NAT. RESOURCES DEF. COUNCIL, 
http://www.nrdc.org/buildinggreen/factsheets/cost.asp (last visited Apr. 9, 2013), available at http://
perma.cc/XW96-82UL. 
 74 KATS, supra note 56, at 12, 18. 
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build green decreases.75 Researchers often have difficulty calculating precisely 
how much more expensive, if at all, green construction projects are.76 Among 
other reasons, this is a result of certification programs not requiring cost in-
formation in the certification process and many businesses desiring to keep this 
information private.77 Data is growing regarding this question, however, and 
some real-world examples show that a green building can be built for an aver-
age of two percent more than typical construction.78 But as green materials 
become more mainstream and designers and architects more experienced, even 
this modest cost increase might come to overstate the true additional cost of 
green construction.79 
There is more certainty among researchers that regardless of the extent of 
additional initial costs of green construction, such costs will be recovered or 
exceeded over the life of the building.80 For example, a study on LEED certifi-
cation found that an upfront investment of an additional 2% resulted in life 
cycle savings of 20%.81 Therefore, green construction currently comes with a 
modest premium that is typically outweighed considerably by the cost savings 
throughout the life of the building.82 Specifically, one comprehensive study 
concluded plainly that “green building is cost-effective and makes financial 
sense today.”83 
II. THE GREEN BUILDING MOVEMENT IN ACTION 
A. Cities with Successful Green Building Initiatives 
To understand the success of the green building movement, it is important 
to learn about examples of its real-world effectiveness.84 Cities such as Chica-
go, Portland, and New York have taken the initiative to make green construc-
                                                                                                                           
 75 Id. at 17, 18. 
 76 Id. at 12. 
 77 Id. Other factors that make quantifying the cost of green construction difficult include green 
buildings being built as showcase pieces, the learning curve for green construction, the newness of 
many green technologies, and the immaturity of designers’ knowledge about such technologies. Id. at 
13. 
 78 Id.; Fact Sheets: How Much Does Green Building Really Cost?, supra note 73. 
 79 KATS, supra note 56, at 18; OFFICE OF THE FED. ENVTL. EXEC., supra note 15, at 31. 
 80 KATS, supra note 56, at ii; Bennett et al., supra note 8, § 1.01(3) at 2; Fact Sheets: How Much 
Does Green Building Really Cost?, supra note 73. 
 81 The Business Case for Green Building, supra note 56. 
 82 See Bennett et al., supra note 8, § 1.01(3) at 2; KATS, supra note 56, at ii; The Business Case 
for Green Building, supra note 56. 
 83 KATS, supra note 56, at ix. 
 84 See infra notes 88–110 and accompanying text. 
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tion a citywide focus.85 Each of these cities has developed a comprehensive 
plan through which the city demonstrates and executes its commitment to 
green construction and overall sustainability throughout the city.86 These cities 
allow the rest of the nation to observe the benefits of pursuing green construc-
tion and create spillover effects through setting examples.87 
1. Chicago 
Chicago’s green building initiatives focus heavily on Leadership in Ener-
gy and Environmental Design (LEED) certification, and the city recently led 
the nation in the number of LEED certified projects, at 295.88 It may be sur-
prising to learn that a city full of skyscrapers is so committed to green building 
initiatives, but Chicago stands tall with 124 LEED certified buildings as of 
2010.89 Furthermore, Chicago’s buildings boast more than four million square 
feet of green roofing, which cools the city and absorbs rainwater.90 In 2004, the 
city’s leaders declared that all new or retrofitted city buildings would be LEED 
certified.91 This push to green the public sector came from an understanding 
that the city officials should not encourage the private sector to do what it was 
unwilling to do itself.92 Chicago now has a Sustainable Development Policy in 
place that requires any projects receiving public funding to incorporate sus-
tainable elements or designs.93 
This concerted effort has made building contractors more proficient in 
green construction techniques and has made the expense for constructing a 
LEED certifiable building nearly the same as a non-LEED version.94 This type 
                                                                                                                           
 85 See Bennett et al., supra note 8, § 1.07(2) at 18–19; infra notes 88–110 and accompanying text. 
 86 See CITY OF CHICAGO, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT POLICY 1 (2007), available at http://
www.cityofchicago.org/dam/city/depts/zlup/Sustainable_Development/Publications/GreenMatrix20
11DHED.pdf and http://perma.cc/7MAE-QTJN (Chicago’s plan); Grey to Green Accomplishments, 
CITY OF PORTLAND, http://www.portlandoregon.gov/bes/article/321331 (last visited Feb. 26, 2014), 
available at http://perma.cc/5B57-FNQT (Portland’s plan); CITY OF NEW YORK, PLANYC UPDATE 
APRIL 2011, at 3 (2011), available at http://nytelecom.vo.llnwd.net/o15/agencies/planyc2030/pdf/
planyc_2011_planyc_full_report.pdf and http://perma.cc/H92C-L4H4 (New York City’s plan); infra 
notes 88–110 and accompanying text. 
 87 Kari Richardson, Chicago Takes the LEED in Eco Building, GRIST (Sept. 9, 2010), http://grist.
org/article/2010-08-30-chicago-takes-the-leed-in-eco-building/, available at http://perma.cc/KB4L-53C8. 
 88 U.S. GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL, TOP US LEED CITIES 1 (2012), available at http://www.usgbc.
org/ShowFile.aspx?DocumentID=7744 and http://perma.cc/NME7-LVP9; see CITY OF CHICAGO, 
supra note 86. 
 89 Richardson, supra note 87. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id.; see CITY OF CHICAGO, supra note 86. 
 94 Richardson, supra note 87. 
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of success did not go unnoticed, and now cities such as Portland, Oregon and 
Atlanta, Georgia are seeking to compete with Chicago’s sustainable leadership.95 
2. Portland 
Portland, Oregon is home to dozens of LEED Platinum96 certified buildings 
ranging from private residences to university buildings.97 One impressive suc-
cess story of LEED Platinum certification is Oregon Health and Science Univer-
sity’s sixteen-story Center for Health and Healing (“Center”), which projected a 
total of 61% energy savings and 56% water savings.98 This research facility in-
corporates extensive sustainable techniques aimed at harnessing nature’s “free 
resources” such as solar power and harvesting of rainwater.99 The Center is one 
of the largest facilities in the country to achieve LEED Platinum certification and 
was the first medical facility to be certified Platinum.100 Perhaps most impres-
sively, this building, which has such significantly reduced operating costs, was 
constructed on a conventional budget.101 
This commitment to sustainable building can be seen elsewhere in the 
city through Portland’s “Grey to Green” initiative.102 The goals of this citywide 
effort toward sustainability include adding more than forty new acres of green 
roofing, planting tens of thousands of trees throughout the city, and construct-
ing more than 900 new green facilities.103 
3. New York City 
Another major metropolis that implemented a citywide initiative to focus 
on environmental consciousness is New York City, through its PlaNYC 2030 
                                                                                                                           
 95 Id. 
 96 Platinum is LEED’s highest ranking. Bennett et al., supra note 8, § 1.03 at 5; LEED Certifica-
tion Information, supra note 16. 
 97 Case Studies, NAT. RESOURCES DEF. COUNCIL, http://www.nrdc.org/buildinggreen/casestudies/
default.asp (last visited Apr. 9, 2013), available at http://perma.cc/QG9-2A4D; LEED Platinum Certi-
fied Buildings, M. LANDMAN, http://www.mlandman.com/gbuildinginfo/leedplatinum.shtml#OR (last 
visited Feb. 26, 2014), available at http://perma.cc/PP45-ZBGV. 
 98 Case Studies, supra note 97. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Christina Williams, OHSU Building Earns Second LEED Platinum, SUSTAINABLE BUS. ORE-
GON (Sep. 23, 2011), http://www.sustainablebusinessoregon.com/articles/2011/09/ohsu-building-
earns-second-leed-platinum.html, available at http://perma.cc/XF3L-YSQ8. 
 101 See Case Studies, supra note 97. 
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program.104 Launched in 2007, this program goes beyond green buildings 
alone to incorporate environmentalism into all aspects of city life, from food to 
parklands to waste management.105 The updated plan for 2013 included 132 
initiatives in a wide array of areas and more than four hundred milestones that 
the city hoped to reach by the end of that year. 106 
Much like the LEED certification system, the green building portion of 
PlaNYC 2030 is a multifaceted approach that addresses water and energy effi-
ciency, air quality, climate change, and integration with existing infrastruc-
ture.107 This portion of the program contains specific goals for reducing envi-
ronmental impacts such as decreasing greenhouse gas emissions by thirty per-
cent below 2007 levels by 2030 and retrofitting existing buildings once every 
ten years.108 
As of September 2011, four years after the plan launched, the city was on 
track to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by thirty percent by 2017, well ahead 
of the proposed schedule.109 Furthermore, half a million trees had been planted 
in the city since 2007.110 
B. Legislative Initiatives 
Interest in participating in the green building movement is apparent at all 
levels of government.111 This allows for a wide variety of programs and incen-
                                                                                                                           
 104 The Plan, PLANYC, http://www.nyc.gov/html/planyc2030/html/theplan/the-plan.shtml (last 
visited Feb. 26, 2014), available at http://perma.cc/5QEL-NU5L; see CITY OF NEW YORK, supra note 
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 105 The Plan, supra note 104; see CITY OF NEW YORK, supra note 86. 
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NEW YORK CITY (Sept. 20, 2011), http://inhabitat.com/nyc/nyc-has-lowered-greenhouse-gas-
emissions-by-12-since-2005/, available at http://perma.cc/PSH2-YCLJ. 
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 111 U.S. GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL, FEDERAL SUMMIT 2010: LEADERSHIP IN SUSTAINABILITY FROM 
COAST TO COAST 2 (2010), available at  http://www.usgbc.org/Docs/Archive/General/Docs6887.pdf 
and http://perma.cc/A55X-N2VZ; Bennett et al., supra note 8, § 1.05(1) at 11; U.S. GREEN BLDG. 
COUNCIL, supra note 7, at 12; see, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 12-502 (Lexis 2011) (state 
involvement); Exec. Order No. 13,123, 64 Fed. Reg. 30,851 (Jun. 8, 1999) (federal involvement); 
Grey to Green Accomplishments, supra note 86 (local involvement). 
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tives based on the powers vested in the varying types of government.112 Addi-
tionally, LEED certification plays a prominent role in green building legisla-
tion at all levels of government.113 
1. Federal Legislative Initiatives 
The federal government’s involvement in the green building movement is 
perhaps most recognizable through the ENERGY STAR program, which was 
developed by the EPA and the Department of Energy.114 The ENERGY STAR 
program promotes the use of sustainable construction through rating systems 
that designate appropriate buildings as superior users of energy.115 Other 
measures undertaken by the federal government include various Memoranda of 
Understanding and Executive Orders directed at continuing the momentum of 
the green building movement.116 Of note among these is Executive Order 
13,123, which seeks to “green the government” through various environmental 
requirements such as the mandate that “each agency shall reduce energy con-
sumption per gross square foot of its facilities . . . by 35 percent by 2010 rela-
tive to 1985.”117 Much like the philosophy in Chicago, the federal government 
is taking the approach of setting a public example through which the private 
sector may be influenced by requiring improvements of its own facilities.118 
Regulation of federal buildings leans heavily on LEED standards, with 
seven major federal agencies119 and the Armed Forces incorporating LEED 
into their policies and practices.120 As of 2003, federal buildings comprised 
                                                                                                                           
 112 See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 12-502 (state involvement requiring green certifica-
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 118 Compare id., with Richardson, supra note 87. 
 119 The major federal agencies adopting LEED standards are the General Services Administration, 
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roughly ten percent of LEED registered projects.121 A typical requirement for 
these agencies is that each obtain some level of LEED certification on all or a 
portion of the buildings they own or operate.122 Most often, the level of certifi-
cation demanded is LEED Silver.123 
2. State Legislative Initiatives 
Of critical importance to the success of this movement is the involvement 
of state governments because of the lack of comprehensive federal green build-
ing laws requiring action from the states.124 Washington State provides an ex-
ample of such state-sponsored endorsement of the green building movement 
with its 2005 green building legislation, the first stated-enacted legislation of 
its kind.125 This law requires that any public agency intending to construct or 
renovate a major facility first conduct a life cycle analysis to ensure the energy 
efficiency of the building.126 More recently, in 2011, Maryland passed a bill 
adopting the International Green Construction Code statewide.127 These are 
merely two examples of the now-widespread state legislation requiring or in-
centivizing green construction.128 As of 2010, forty-five states had endorsed in 
some fashion, either through legislation, executive order, or incentives, a 
LEED-based initiative.129 
3. Local Initiatives 
Finally, the green building movement’s continued momentum can also be 
traced to the support of local governments.130 More than twenty-five cities 
have established LEED-based requirements for new public buildings and many 
have also passed incentive programs for privately funded buildings that 
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 128 This trend has continued with other states, such as Connecticut and New Jersey, enacting simi-
lar legislation. Bennett et al., supra note 8, § 1.06(2)(b) at 17; see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:32-5.3 (West 
2013); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-217mm (2013). 
 129 U.S. GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL, LEED INITIATIVES BY STATE 1 (2010), available at https://www.
usgbc.org/ShowFile.aspx?DocumentID=7924 and http://perma.cc/FQ6R-GTBG. 
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achieve some form of nationally recognized green certification.131 An example 
of such a local initiative is Atlanta, Georgia’s requirement that all city build-
ings above a certain size and cost obtain at least a LEED Silver rating.132 Addi-
tionally, Seattle, Washington incentivizes commercial and residential buildings 
to achieve a LEED Silver rating by authorizing greater heights and/or floor 
areas to those that meet the requirements.133 These local programs can be pow-
erful because of their ability to adapt quickly and organize to create incentives 
and requirements that will work best for their specific circumstances.134 
III. ANTITRUST LAW 
Although the green building movement is still in its infancy in many re-
spects, the movement has gained steam during the past several years and is on 
a path of continued growth.135 This potential to persist in offering substantial 
environmental benefits, however, is not without the capacity for legal pit-
falls.136 One possible and significant pitfall exists regarding antitrust law.137 
This Part outlines the body of law that could have major effects on the United 
States Green Buildings Council’s (USGBC) Leadership in Energy and Envi-
ronmental Design (LEED) certification system.138 Although this issue has yet 
to be brought to court, existing precedent could expose such a widely adopted 
standard as LEED to significant problems.139 
A. The Sherman Act 
Passed in 1890, the Sherman Antitrust Act is the binding authority pro-
tecting consumers from commercial combinations or conspiracies to restrain 
free trade.140 The intention of this Act, as articulated by the Supreme Court, is 
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“in the most comprehensive way to provide against combinations or conspira-
cies in restraint of trade or commerce, the monopolization of trade or com-
merce or attempts to monopolize the same.”141 This Act seeks to maintain the 
equality of opportunity in trade by forbidding actions or combinations that 
suppress competition.142 To make a claim under the Sherman Act that trade has 
been unreasonably restrained, a plaintiff must show an agreement to restrain 
trade that resulted in injury to the plaintiff’s business or property.143 Because 
agreements to conspire are extremely rare, proof of an explicit agreement is 
not essential to prove a claim under the Sherman Act.144 
All contracts between potential competitors are not necessarily in viola-
tion of the Sherman Act, even those that might have some anticompetitive ef-
fects.145 Rather, a “rule of reason” analysis is typically employed when a court 
examines a contract against which claims of Sherman Act violations have been 
made.146 This analysis involves “consideration of the facts peculiar to the busi-
ness in which the restraint is applied, the nature of the restraint and its effects 
and the history of the restraint and the reasons for its adoption.”147 Courts have 
interpreted this to be a fact-based analysis focused on three variables, namely, 
economic effects, the power of the parties in their markets, and the underlying 
motives.148 
B. The Noerr Doctrine 
In the 1961 case Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor 
Freight, Inc., the Supreme Court articulated an exception to antitrust liability 
under the Sherman Act.149 This case involved railroad companies in Pennsyl-
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vania engaging in a publicity campaign to block the passage of a law that 
would benefit trucking companies with whom they were in direct competi-
tion.150 The trucking companies alleged violation of the Sherman Act through 
this combined effort, but the Supreme Court declined to find such violation, 
stating, “[n]o violation of the Sherman Act can be predicated upon mere at-
tempts to influence the passage or enforcement of laws.”151 This is true even if 
the conduct has a tendency to create anticompetitive effects.152 This ruling cre-
ated an exception to antitrust liability wherein restraint stemming from action 
petitioning the government is immune.153 Subsequent decisions have applied 
this doctrine, recognizing that the Sherman Act regulates business and not poli-
tics.154 Although many courts have declined to extend the reach of this doc-
trine,155 it remains a frequent defense against antitrust allegations.156 
C. Allied Tube and Its Implications on Qualifying for Noerr Immunity 
In the 1988 Supreme Court case Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian 
Head Inc., the plaintiffs alleged antitrust violations based on what they be-
lieved were efforts by their competitors, steel conduit producers, to keep their 
product, a plastic conduit, out of the National Fire Protection Association’s 
(NFPA) National Electric Code (NEC).157 During a vote on whether to permit 
use of plastic conduits under the NEC, the steel conduit producers recruited 
additional members to vote against the proposal and were successful in block-
ing its passage.158 This vote-rigging conduct was not in violation of any of the 
NFPA’s rules.159 
The Supreme Court recognized the NEC as “the most influential electric 
code in the nation” which many governments had adopted into law.160 Despite 
this fact, the Court held that a private association responsible for standard-
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setting which could have broad legislative impact is still not quasi-legislative 
and therefore not qualified for Noerr immunity.161 Applying a rule-of-reason 
analysis, the Court concluded that Noerr immunity depends not just on the po-
tential legislative impact of the conduct but on its context and nature.162 Be-
cause the standard-setting decision took place in a purely private arena involv-
ing economically interested parties, the Court declined to view it as a legiti-
mate effort to influence government action, making Noerr immunity inappli-
cable.163 The Court felt this conduct could “more aptly be characterized as 
commercial activity with political impact” than a bona fide attempt to petition 
the government.164 
Two dissenting justices disagreed, however, and would have ruled the 
NFPA’s standard-setting role to be quasi-legislative and therefore eligible for 
Noerr immunity.165 Because of the near automatic nature in which these stand-
ards were being widely adopted into law, and the dependence of state and local 
governments on delegation of this work to experts, the dissenting justices 
powerfully yet unsuccessfully urged immunity for the steel conduit produc-
ers.166 
D. Radiant Burners and Claims of Industry Bias 
The issues of standard-setting and antitrust liability were also before the 
Supreme Court in the 1961 case Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & 
Coke Co..167 In that case, plaintiffs alleged that industry bias produced non-
objective standard-setting and resulted in their burners not being approved by 
the American Gas Association.168 This allegedly damaged the plaintiffs be-
cause utility members refused to supply gas to plaintiffs based on their lack of 
approval.169 The plaintiffs contended that defendant’s unreasonable refusal to 
approve their product was a part of a conspiracy to restrain interstate com-
merce by excluding them from the market.170 The Supreme Court held that this 
adequately stated a claim upon which relief could be granted and reversed the 
lower court, which had dismissed the claim.171 
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IV. LEED’S CONTINUED SUCCESS MIGHT DEPEND UPON ITS ABILITY  
TO AVOID ANTITRUST LIABILITY 
Thus far, the United States Green Building Council (USGBC) and its 
Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) standard have gone 
largely unchallenged as they help to push the green building movement for-
ward.172 This will not necessarily continue, as current antitrust case law has a 
clear application to LEED.173 This Part first examines how Allied Tube & Con-
duit Corp. v. Indian Head Inc. and Radiant Burners Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light 
& Coke Co. create the possibility of antitrust liability against LEED.174 Next, 
this Part explores possible paths that the USGBC can take to avoid having its 
work undone.175 
A. Analogizing Allied and Radiant to LEED 
At their cores, Allied and Radiant are both cases about private standard-
setting bodies.176 This makes their application to the green building movement 
and the USGBC’s private standard-setting through LEED certification readily 
apparent.177 There is a possibility for antitrust actions to arise based on the near 
ubiquitous use of LEED certification as the standard in green building regula-
tions written into law.178 LEED has risen to popularity very quickly, and in the 
fewer than fifteen years since its launch, it has all but cornered the market on 
green building certification.179 The antitrust issue arises from the exclusive 
adoption in many jurisdictions of this privately developed certification system 
as the legally binding standard for green building regulation.180 
Much like the standards set by the National Electric Code in Allied and 
the American Gas Association in Radiant, standards chosen by LEED can have 
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serious impacts for industry.181 The continued selection of LEED standards by 
governments passing green building legislation will make that system’s domi-
nance inescapable and might create an incentive for members of industry to 
influence standard-setting decisions.182 This possibility of a government-
created monopoly of green building certification might spur action from the 
other private-party verification systems that have developed and from mem-
bers of industry who may feel that they have been snubbed by LEED’s stand-
ard.183 
The court in Allied refused to apply the immunity articulated in Eastern 
Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight Inc. to a standard-
setting organization wielding power similar to that now possessed by the 
USGBC through LEED.184 Although in Allied there was clearly biased conduct 
meant to exclude the plastic conduit makers from the market, Radiant shows 
that such flagrant anticompetitive spirit is not necessary for a court to find mer-
it in an antitrust claim against a standard-setting body.185 The Radiant court 
recognized nonobjective standards alone as sufficient to state an antitrust 
claim.186 Indeed, the Allied court recognized that “private standard-setting as-
sociations have traditionally been objects of antitrust scrutiny.”187 Therefore, 
even without malicious intent, the power that the USGBC wields in deciding 
what products, techniques, and innovations are recognized for LEED certifica-
tion and the regulatory compliance that ensues might open it to real issues of 
antitrust liability.188 
Furthermore, there are already accusations stirring that the LEED stand-
ard-setting and certification system is not free of bias.189 One USA Today arti-
cle describes the people at the helm of LEED as professionals who “specialize 
in—and profit from—the type of design the council certifies and promotes.”190 
The article goes on to claim that an effect of promoting LEED certification to 
public officials is a boost for the businesses owned by USGBC members.191 
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Aside from allegations of bias, LEED also faces criticism regarding its system 
for awarding points, delay in issuing certifications, and lack of follow up to 
ensure that buildings meet the performance standards under which certification 
was awarded.192 Despite success stories relying on LEED certification in cities 
such as Chicago and Portland, Oregon, examples such as New York City’s 
PlaNYC prove that the USGBC/LEED framework is not the only viable option 
for organized efforts for sustainability.193 LEED’s shortcomings, especially 
those reflecting bias in decision-making, combined with the strong Supreme 
Court precedent found in Allied and Radiant, create true potential for antitrust 
liability, which LEED would not be able to escape via a defense of Noerr im-
munity.194 
The USGBC has not come under antitrust attack yet, but possible expla-
nations for the current lack of lawsuits alleging antitrust violations are the 
mere infancy of the green building movement and obstacles to bringing such 
suits.195 Given the significant stakes for various industries in obtaining LEED 
approval, litigation seems nearly inevitable should some litigious party get 
snubbed.196 
B. Recommendations for LEED to Avoid Antitrust Liability 
In a world with a booming population and ever-increasing consumption 
needs, the efforts toward sustainable solutions are of paramount importance.197 
Among such solutions is the green building movement, which, in the short 
time since its inception, has already begun to show its enormous capacity to 
bring about positive environmental change.198 Despite garnering nationwide 
support, this movement’s foremost standard-setting body, the USGBC, could 
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face potentially crippling liability.199 Because the goals that the USGBC seeks 
to achieve through its LEED certification system have been successful, useful, 
and worth fostering, it is important that this organization understands how to 
prevent its initiative from being derailed.200 This section examines several rec-
ommendations for how the USGBC can hope to foreclose antitrust liability 
stemming from the proliferation of the LEED certification standard.201 Specifi-
cally, this section recommends that the USGBC ensure a neutral decisionmak-
ing process, encourage public involvement in the standard-setting process, 
seek recognition as a quasi-legislative body, and argue for a court to adopt the 
dissent from Allied.202 
1. Neutral Decision-Making Process 
True legitimacy and inability to manipulate the standard-setting process is 
an important and necessary step in avoiding antitrust liability.203 In Allied, anti-
trust liability was found after the voting members of the National Fire Protec-
tion Association (NFPA) recruited new members to vote in a proceeding for 
the express and admitted purpose of blocking a proposal to approve plastic 
conduits.204 Although this conduct was not in violation of any of the NFPA’s 
rules, the Court held that “antitrust validity of these efforts is not established, 
without more, by petitioner’s literal compliance with the rules of the [NFPA], 
for the hope of procompetitive benefits depends upon the existence of safe-
guards sufficient to prevent the standard-setting process from being biased by 
members with economic interests in restraining competition.”205 
Furthermore, in Radiant, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of an an-
titrust claim that alleged anticompetitive effects stemming from tests that were 
not based on objective standards.206 In that case, the plaintiffs made no allega-
tions of conduct as obviously manipulative as that found in Allied, yet the 
Court still held that they stated a claim upon which relief could be granted.207 
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Together, these two cases demonstrate the necessity of establishing unbi-
ased and objective procedures for standard-setting, especially for bodies whose 
standards have been as widely adopted into law as the NFPA’s National Elec-
tric Code (NEC) and the USGBC’s LEED standard have been.208 Neutral, dis-
interested decision-makers would be ideal, but because those who know the 
field best most often are those who work or invest in it, that ambition is unlike-
ly to be achieved.209 What is possible, however, is that the USGBC take steps 
at all times to base its standard-setting decisions on objective tests and set 
standards through a process free from manipulation.210 Unfortunately, exactly 
what would satisfy this recommendation is unclear because the Allied court 
declined to articulate the rules of antitrust liability governing private standard-
setting processes.211 
Should any antitrust suits be filed against the USGBC, the court would 
examine the validity of the LEED standards under a rule–of–reason analysis, 
as is customary in such suits.212 As previously stated, this analysis would in-
volve consideration of the economic effects of the standard, the power of the 
parties in their markets, and their underlying motives.213 Objective tests and 
processes that cannot be manipulated into sham proceedings would likely re-
flect favorably on the USGBC and encourage a finding that any anticompeti-
tive effects were not the underlying motive of the standard.214 Antitrust liability 
is predicated on a context-specific analysis wherein the LEED standard might 
seek refuge in the objectivity behind its endorsement.215 
2. Public Involvement 
Another avenue through which the USGBC might avoid antitrust liability 
is through public involvement in its standard-setting process.216 This stems 
from the acknowledgement that LEED standards have been so widely adopted 
by federal, state, and local governments, or have influenced the standards that 
these governments have crafted themselves.217 Therefore, the USGBC could be 
afforded Noerr immunity if, when setting or changing standards, it did so in a 
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manner that a court could characterize as an effort to influence legislation.218 
Noerr articulated the exception to antitrust liability that public petitioning for 
legislative action would be immune despite the tendency of such action to pro-
duce anticompetitive effects.219 In circumstances where the USGBC might an-
ticipate antitrust backlash from a certain standard, public involvement in the 
passage of that standard might result in immunity under Noerr.220 
It is important to note that this public petitioning cannot be a sham pro-
ceeding becuse, as the Allied court stated, “[w]e cannot agree . . . that the 
Noerr doctrine immunizes every concerted effort that is genuinely intended to 
influence governmental action.”221 Just as a sham proceeding was unsuccessful 
at gaining Noerr immunity in Allied, a publicity campaign and forum for the 
passage of a LEED standard would not be valid in the eyes of the court if it 
appeared to have been rigged.222 Public involvement and scrutiny would pro-
vide the needed objectivity in the process of deciding on standards and sound-
ness of the procedures through which standards are set.223 
Although this kind of precaution might only be necessary in those situa-
tions where a LEED standard risks creating a monopoly, it still involves some 
degree of sacrifice of the private nature of the USGBC by transforming an in-
dependent organization into a lobbying body at times.224 Furthermore, given 
that LEED is currently developed exclusively by experts, the feasibility and 
administrability of incorporating public involvement is questionable.225 There-
fore, this recommendation should be confined to only those situations where 
an antitrust suit would seem inevitable without some safeguard against liabil-
ity.226 
3. Recognition as a Quasi-Legislative Body 
A second and perhaps more achievable possibility for the USGBC to gain 
Noerr immunity is to obtain authority as a quasi-legislative body, making the 
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standards it sets akin to those set by the government and free from antitrust 
liability.227 Currently, LEED enjoys the frequent adoption of its standards into 
law at all levels of government, but this alone is not sufficient, under Allied, to 
confer on the USGBC sufficient authority to avoid liability.228 The Allied deci-
sion emphasized a distinction between private, self-interested activity and po-
litical activity aimed at furthering the public interest.229 Due primarily to the 
unaccountability to the public of the people in charge of the NFPA, the court 
found that their authority fell short of the latter category and could not be 
granted immunity.230 
The parallels between the NFPA’s NEC and the USGBC’s LEED standard 
are numerous.231 Although governments routinely endorse both standards, the 
NFPA and the USGBC remain private organizations without true mechanisms 
for accountability to the public.232 Furthermore, both are susceptible to the in-
fluence of industry.233 Therefore, given the current state of the law, the 
USGBC cannot reasonably expect to fare any better in an antitrust action than 
the NFPA did.234 
Should the USGBC not protect itself, it would face a rule-of-reason anal-
ysis for each individual action, with the hopes of success based on less fla-
grantly anticompetitive motives than those engaged in by Allied’s steel conduit 
producers.235 Instead of that cumbersome route, the USGBC should seek a del-
egation of power from the governments that adopt its LEED standards.236 As a 
result of such delegation, the USGBC would enjoy the same immunity from 
federal antitrust prosecution as an agency of the federal government.237 This 
delegation would have to be made explicit, however, because whether the im-
munity applies to a private party “depends on the extent to which the Govern-
ment is acting pursuant to a clearly articulated policy or program.”238 Nonethe-
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less, this could be a simpler method for resolving the vulnerability in LEED 
than repeated case–by–case, context–specific analysis.239 
4. Reliance Upon the Dissent in Allied 
The fourth and final recommendation pertains only to how to avoid liabil-
ity, not how to avoid antitrust suits entirely.240 Although only two Supreme 
Court justices241 dissented, the dissent in Allied made several strong points that 
would be easily applicable to the USGBC and LEED in the context of an anti-
trust suit.242 The dissent opined that the NFPA should be accorded the status of 
a quasi-legislative body and therefore granted the immunity to antitrust suits 
which it sought.243 In advancing this argument, the dissenting justices support-
ed themselves with recognition of the reliance that state and local governments 
placed on the NFPA to produce the NEC.244 They determined that it was “un-
tenable to consider the code-writing process by such organizations as the 
NFPA too far removed from the legislative process to warrant application of 
the doctrine announced in Noerr . . . .”245 Further, they lamented what they 
contended was a “misapplication” of the Noerr doctrine to these facts and the 
liability against organizations like the NFPA that the decision created.246 
If antitrust claims become an issue for the USGBC, along with any of the 
other defenses outlined above, the organization should resurrect the arguments 
articulated in this dissent, as they are certainly applicable to LEED.247 In creat-
ing the LEED standards, the USGBC employs dozens of people whose job it is 
to steer, edit, direct, refine, and implement the LEED certification system.248 
This organization has developed and continues to improve rating systems for 
nine different types of projects or buildings.249 This is a complicated and in-
volved endeavor on which governments have come to depend.250 This is evi-
denced by LEED repeatedly being chosen as the standard for green regulation 
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rather than governments creating their own standards.251 Furthermore, because 
the USGBC perpetually reevaluates its LEED standards to remain at the fore-
front of the field, it requires standing committees to review new data.252 These 
committees are comprised of experts in the many disciplines necessary to set 
standards for water efficiency, air quality, materials sustainability, siting con-
sciousness, and all other areas covered by LEED.253 The government conduct-
ing work of this scale is neither feasible nor advisable, as the cost to the tax-
payer would likely be enormous.254 
The Allied dissent found that large–scale, full–time work like that of the 
USGBC and the NFPA, as well as more than 400 other private standard-setting 
organizations, “contributes enormously to the public interest and . . . participa-
tion . . . by those who have technical competence and experience to do so 
should not be discouraged.”255 Although perhaps the weakest of the recom-
mendations because the arguments did not win the Allied court, this approach 
still has merit in an era of increasing delegation in this area of highly specified 
duties to private parties such as the USGBC.256 
CONCLUSION 
The green building movement has shown great potential for significant 
environmental benefits. A leader in this movement has been the United States 
Green Building Council (USGBC) through its Leadership in Energy and Effi-
cient Design (LEED) standard. Although confidence in this standard remains 
high and many levels of government have chosen to adopt it as their standard 
for certifying a green building, antitrust case law presents a potential problem. 
For the USGBC to protect itself from liability as well as for the public to trust 
and rely on the USGBC’s standard-setting procedures, steps must be taken to 
avoid committing antitrust violations. In this way LEED can remain the legit-
imate force for good it was created to be and the public can continue to benefit 
from increasingly efficient and sustainable buildings. 
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